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The Politics of Disaster Relief: China, Taiwan and the Haitian Earthquake

Publication: China Brief Volume: 10 Issue: 3February 4, 2010 02:08 PM Age: 19 hrsCategory: China Brief, Home Page, Featured, China and the Asia-Pacific, Latin America
By: Daniel Erikson

After a devastating 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti on January 12, the aftershock reached China in ways that few observers could have anticipated. After all, the link between the world’s most powerful rising economy and one of its most troubled states is tenuous. China and Haiti are worlds apart in almost every conceivable sense: profoundly separated by geography, levels of development, language and culture. Moreover, Beijing and Port-au-Prince are diplomatically estranged, as Haiti remains one of 23 countries that still maintain official relations with Taiwan. Still, the powerful seismic event that has claimed the lives of as many as 150,000 Haitians so far also posed an unexpected challenge for the Chinese leadership, which found itself viscerally drawn into the crisis and its aftermath in ways that tested its newfound diplomatic mettle, and provoked conflicting conceptions about its expanding role on the international stage. Faced with a skeptical audience abroad and a supportive one at home, the Haitian earthquake forced Chinese leaders to navigate the tricky politics of disaster relief.

According to China’s foreign ministry, there were about 230 Chinese nationals in Haiti at the time of the earthquake (China Daily, January 19). Yet, eight were in the most sensitive spot imaginable, meeting with the chief of the United Nations mission in Haiti, Hedi Annabi, at the Hotel Christopher, which served as the head of the 9,000-member strong U.N. peacekeeping force that has patrolled Haiti since the ousting of former president Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 2004. The five-story building collapsed when the quake struck, and China suddenly found itself at the epicenter of a tragedy that killed more U.N. staff in a single day than any other event in the 65-year history of the United Nations. Hundreds of U.N. staff were initially unaccounted for, and by January 29th, more than two weeks later, the U.N. had officially confirmed 85 deaths, while dozens more remained missing (BBC News, January 29).

Haiti, the poorest and most vulnerable nation in the Western Hemisphere, has long been caught in a war of attrition between China and Taiwan that has at times threatened to undermine international efforts to bring the country back from the brink of state failure. Haiti has been a firm ally of Taiwan since 1956, and has received millions of dollars in foreign aid as a result. In recent years, Taiwan stood virtually alone among the international community in continuing to support the government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Haiti when Western donors, like the United States and Europe, imposed a devastating bilateral aid cut-off from 2000 to 2004. When Aristide was forced from power in 2004, Taiwan maintained smooth relations with the interim government and is especially close to Haiti’s current president, René Préval, who was elected in 2006. China, by contrast, has made a minimal investment in Haiti, but Beijing began to loom larger for Haitian leaders since 2004, when China contributed 125 riot police to the Brazilian-led U.N. stabilization force deployed in Haiti, and then subsequently leveraged its permanent member status on the Security Council to prevent Taiwanese Premier Su Tseng-chang from attending the inauguration of Rene Préval in May 2006. (BBC News, May 13, 2006). In recent years, however, tensions had cooled and a fragile détente appeared to emerge between China and Taiwan with regard to resolving the issue of diplomatic status with Haiti.

Against this backdrop, the Chinese government’s response to the earthquake was driven by a mix of overlapping and potentially conflicting domestic and international motivations. These included protecting Chinese nationals still in Haiti, recovering the bodies of their fallen countrymen, acting as a key stakeholder in the multilateral system, and assuming the humanitarian responsibilities of an emerging great power. Equally important was the desire to manage domestic political sentiments regarding China’s role in the world in a manner that would strengthen—or at least do no harm to—the cause of Chinese nationalism. Efforts to deepen cooperation with the United States, bolster China’s standing in Latin America and the Caribbean and possibly further isolate Taiwan were also relevant, though of less immediate concern. Given the multiple motivations that drove China’s engagement in Haiti, it is no surprise that Beijing reacted quickly, only to achieve uneven results.

To its credit, China was among the first nations to respond to the Haitian catastrophe with rescue workers, aid and supplies. China’s 60-member search and rescue team soon departed Beijing and arrived in Port-au-Prince at 2 a.m. on the morning of January 14, making the 20-hour trip on a chartered plane with minimal refueling stops. The Chinese government also announced a donation of humanitarian aid valued at $4.4 million while the Red Cross Society of China pledged an additional $1 million (Xinhua News Agency, January 16). China had itself suffered a devastating earthquake in Sichuan province in May 2008, which killed more than 80,000 people, and Chinese leaders stressed that their actions were motivated by genuine sympathy and supplemented by practical experience in disaster relief (China Daily, January 14). China’s relief efforts were focused on excavating the Hotel Christopher and the team was credited with retrieving the body of U.N. Mission Chief Hedi Annabi.

Yet, once China’s eight-member police delegation was recovered, the team ceased its work at the U.N. site and was later seen departing the country, provoking criticism that China’s efforts in Haiti were motivated by narrow-minded nationalism. The allegations incensed China, prompting foreign ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu to fume: “These comments are false and are made out of ulterior motives . . . these actions are not selfish and brook no accusations. The accusers should be accused.” (Agence France Presse, January 19). In fact, while some members of the initial Chinese rescue mission soon returned to China, a subset of the team stayed behind to deliver medical care to a badly damaged sector of Port-au-Prince (Xinhua News Agency, January 19).

The Chinese fatalities in Haiti quickly emerged as a top item in China’s domestic politics as Beijing officials commemorated the victims in a series of elaborate ceremonies that adroitly straddled sentimentality and nationalist pride. In recent years, China has placed increasing importance on its contribution to U.N. peacekeeping missions—and the successive rotations of 125 riot police that have served in Haiti since 2004 are part of a broader strategy that has seen more than 14,000 troops participate in 24 separate missions. Prior to the Haitian earthquake, only eight Chinese officials had died in U.N. missions around the world; the eight Chinese fatalities in Port-au-Prince instantly doubled that figure to sixteen. The loss of the Chinese peacekeepers in Haiti dominated the country’s headlines for days, and the official People’s Liberation Army Daily hailed their return to China, stating “Peacekeeping heroes, the fatherland greets you on your return home” (The Associated Press, January 20). China’s Ministry of Public Security named all eight of the deceased peacekeepers as “martyrs,” and three were posthumously awarded the title of “peacekeeping heroes” by the State Council and the Central Military Commission, while the other five were named “hero models” (Xinhua News Agency, January 25). China dispatched four additional peacekeepers to replace their fallen colleagues in Haiti (the other four who died were part of a visiting delegation).

A burial ceremony was held at the Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery in Beijing, an honor bestowed only upon those of national importance. The ceremony was also attended by top Chinese officials, including President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao. While China’s official press praised the outpour of sympathy for the officers and their families, it also reported several critical comments that had been posted to online mourning sites. One person cited “mixed feelings” owing to alleged incidences of police brutality in southwest Guizhou Province, while another surmised that the peacekeepers were corrupt and had been sent abroad for “other purposes.” The Chinese official press emphasized that such postings “were immediately blasted by other netizens, who said lives were precious and the dead should be mourned” (Xinhua News Agency, January 18).

In any case, such allegations against China surely pleased Taiwan, which moved to match Beijing’s aid to Haiti. Interestingly, however, Taiwan did not seize the aftermath of the Haitian earthquake as an opportunity to substantially surpass China’s response, although this would have been well within its capabilities. The reason may lie in Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou, elected in 2008, who has struck a “diplomatic truce” with Beijing that has led to a cooling of diplomatic tussles over the sovereignty question. Still, Taiwan rebuffed a suggestion by Chinese officials to increase cross-strait cooperation in Haiti, although Ma did speak positively about the role of Chinese peacekeepers there.

Taiwan has long been a strong supporter of Haitian President René Préval and prioritized aid to both Haiti and neighboring Dominican Republic as part of a strategy to keep the island of Hispaniola from shifting its allegiance to China [1]. While the total amounts of Chinese and Taiwanese aid to Haiti immediately after the earthquake totaled about $5.4 million each, Taiwan sent its rescue mission and medical relief workers through the Dominican capital of Santo Domingo. Two weeks after the earthquake, President Ma also met personally with Haitian Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive during a “transit summit” at the Santo Domingo airport. After delivering 10 tons of food and medical supplies, the Taiwanese leader outlined a four-point assistance plan for Haiti in the areas of public health, housing, job creation, and the adoption of orphaned children (Taiwan News, January 29).

The Taiwanese team also focused its efforts on the devastated U.N. mission headquarters, rescuing a Haitian security guard and locating a French staffer who survived under the rubble (Central News Agency [Taiwan], January 18). Due to its ongoing disarray, the Haitian government did not respond substantively to these overtures and, in any event, Haitian authorities are too consumed in managing the earthquake’s aftermath to pay much attention to the Taiwan question in the short term.

Now that the initial calamity in Haiti has begun to subside, China is positioning itself to support multilateral relief efforts while sidestepping any wider leadership responsibilities, such as dramatically increasing the role of Chinese peacekeepers in Haiti or stepping in as a major donor. In the days after the earthquake, the U.S. mobilized 10,000 troops and hundreds of millions of dollars in public and private assistance, and appears likely to play a dominant role in Haiti for months, if not years, to come. In Latin America, many countries have noted that the Chinese response, while admirable, was more consistent with a small, activist country than with a rising global superpower. More Haitians may ultimately be pulled from the rubble by the various teams from Belgium, Iceland, Poland and Turkey than by the Chinese responders, and China’s financial donations to Haiti represent just a tiny fraction of the promises made by the developed world.

Given China’s limited interest in Haiti, it is probably sensible that Beijing take a backseat role to other, more engaged actors as the international community begins to calculate the costs of the long-term reconstruction of the country. China emerges from the Haiti disaster with a bruised ego and a fortified sense of national identity. In addition, China has once again confirmed its deeply held belief that, as far as Latin America and the Caribbean is concerned, Beijing should focus on economics, avoid the politics and respond to crisis helpfully while leaving the serious work of disaster management to Washington.

Notes

1. In addition to the Dominican Republic and Haiti, Taiwan’s diplomatic allies in the region include: Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.

Joel,

Mwen renmen fason ke-w ou intwodwi istwa la chine pou nou comprann pozisyon yo. Se yon bel instruction ke ou ban nou la-a.

Aparment la chine sanblel indiferan a nou. yo pa fe anyin ki bon poun mensyone tout recemment. yo kite Taiwan domine mache ayisyen an sutou nan tan nap viv nan seism lan. Ou peyi osi avanse tankou la chine te supoze pote le plus aid posib poul montre ke li sousye li de aveni, bienet pep ayisyen. nou tout konen se yon gwan pwisans kel ye, minm tipeyi ki depouvu fe pi gwo jes de solidarite. Nou pap mande men nou te espere bocoup plus de yon peyi osi devlope. an fonksyon de sa mwen kwe ke yap rate moman pou montre ke yo se gran suporter de yonpeyi ki gin indepandans li ldepi 2 syek e ki viktim aktyelman de yon gwan seism tankou yo te gen lakay yo.

Se yon ti pey, yon third world country ke nou ye , yo konen kapacite nou, yo te viktim tou de minm seism lan, yo konen ki tip effo ke yo dwe deployer pou venir au secours des gens sinistres. Donk nou kwe ke yo trop tyed nan ed yo bannou.

Mwen regret ke kreyol mwen pa osi byen ke pa-w, sepa lang matenel mwen, min se yon lang kem aprann ekri poukont mwen.

Non Revelasyon,pa vini lan bagay senplistik sa yo.
Si yon moun ap swiv ou sou fowòm,yo konnen pakou w.

Pou oumenm tout bagay ewopeyen bon.Bon pito m rete la sou sa.
Poukisa lan plis ke 200 peyi lan mond lan ,nou se youn lan 23 peyi ki toujou rekonèt Taiwan.
Nou pi entelijan pase lòt yo?
Non mesye ,sispann aprann sèlman istwa ewopeyen yo;aprann istwa La Chine e sa nou a dekouvri ,na sezi.

Kami,
Silvouplè ,al chache sou sit CCTV an ,si w ka jwenn entèvyou premye minis JAMAYIK lan ,ki lan sèn politik peyi sa a se yon pati sant-dwat l ap dirije
Mwen t ap chache l yè pou m poste adrès lan pou wou,men yo genlè poko poste l.
Kòm mwen te di misye te bay entèvyou an lan yon vizit ke l te fè le 5 Fevriye la a ,lan Beijing.
Se lan ribrik "Dialogue".Si w jwenn entèvyou an ,di m sa w panse!

Leu mwen finn li 2 intervention sa yo Joel ak revelation , je suis arrivé à la conclusion que la diplomatie haitienne n'est pas assez intelligente pour défendre ses intérêts et obtenir des apports importants des deux chines pour son développement économique. On a qu'à regarder les trois années du gouvernement Préval , Alexis , Pierre -Louis et Bellerive pour s'en rendre compte. Le président n'a pas de stratégies et on peut même penser que le président n'a pas de lunettes pour voir ni de près ni de loin.

Franchement , Haiti aurait pu faire mieux en matière diplomatique. Je crois que la présidence de René Préval mérite un gros zéro en matière diplomatique.

Historiquement, depuis 1935, Haiti manipulee par whashington est anti communiste... ce qui explique une relation froide avec la chine... Le resultat est qu'Haiti a son ambassade a Taiwan et pas en chine. Il y a juste un representant permanent A Pekin.
Taiwan arrose Haiti avec un peu de sous... comme contrepartie, Haiti donne son vote a Taiwan.

D'un point de vue geopolitique, Haiti est dans la zone d'influence americaine et la chine ne cherche pas vraiment a avoir une infliuence... La chine concentre ses efforts en Afrique.

D'un point de vue strategique, Haiti a son cul entre dans deux chaises... Faut-il privilegier des relations diplomatiques avec la chine?

La reponse n'est pas si simple.... Dans le meilleur des mondes, il faudrait mieux etre copain avec la chine tout en etant ami avec Taiwan.....

Mais qu'est ce que la chine mettra dans la balance...? pas grand chose pour les raisons indiquees? La chine ne veut pas de confrontation avec les americains dans leur zone d'influence... Elle n'a pas vraiment d'interet en Haiti.. En revanche, la chine peut bloquer les interets haitiens au sein des institutions financieres internationales si les haitiens se melent de leur affaires interieures. (taiwan)

Dans le pire des cas, Haiti privilegie La chine, elle gagne quasiment rien, la chine devient un element neutre, et Haiti perd le soutien financier de taiwan.

Voila le dilemne l'haitien, c'est de mettre en oeuvre la theorie du win win..... Mais c'est plus facile a dire qu'a faire.

Haiti pourrait continuer le statu quo.... cela me parait un mauvais choix.....Ou elle choisit de reequilibrer les relations avec la chine tout en maintenant ses relations avec Taiwan... mais la, il s'agit d'un non choix pour la chine, Je pense qu'elle y verra un win lose et n'acceptera pas.

En bon stratege, les haitiens doivent negocier en meme temps avec les deux pour obtenir un plan d'aide au developpement pour Haiti sur plusieurs annees tout en garantissant leur appui... le choix de l'un ou l'autre se fera en fonction du meilleur offrant et non comme par le passe sur des fondements purement ideologiques et droits de l'hommiste.

En matiere diplomatique, philantropie sur philantropie ne vaut pas.

JAMAICA-CHINA RELATIONS MOVING TOWARDS INVESTMENT PHASE

Prime Minister Bruce Golding has told China's businessmen and potential investors that Jamaica wants to move its relations with China to a new phase, one that will look at establishing greater investment links with that country.

He said the relationship between Jamaica and China has been through many phases, initially through programmes of cultural exchanges, to financial assistance in the forms of grants and loans to the Government of Jamaica to undertake important public projects. More recently it has involved the provision of lines of credit and Chinese companies undertaking major projects in Jamaica, as part of the programme of economic co-operation. The Prime Minister said this has brought great benefits to Jamaica in its quest to achieve the kind of development that can ensure a good quality of life for the people of Jamaica.

However, Mr. Golding noted that the primary focus of his visit to China at this time is to see how to move that spirit of cooperation into a new and exciting dimension and to build on the foundation laid since 1972 when formal diplomatic relations were established.

Mr. Golding was addressing a luncheon of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade in Beijing yesterday which saw presentations by the Industry and Commerce Minister Karl Samuda on the range of opportunities that exist for doing business in Jamaica.

Mr. Golding said ‘We believe that Jamaica offers China tremendous opportunities in terms of its global reach and the penetration it is so effectively seeking throughout the world. Jamaica is positioned one-and-a-half hours by air from North America and even less from Central America, within a region that has a population of over 700million people. We see Jamaica as a strategic location that would enhance investments from China seeking to address the growing demands in this particular part of the world'.

Mr. Golding noted that much would have to be done to put the infrastructure in place but he expressed the hope that the exchanges which have been taking place during his various meetings in China will lay a platform to build this exciting phase of the economic relations between Jamaica and China.

The Prime Minister said his aim is to market Jamaica as an investment destination.

Mwen byen kontan reyaksyion sayo ki montre gen plisyè manyè pou gade menm bagay la.

Se rezon saa ki fè ke m te mete sijè enpotan saa sou fowom lan.

1- Jwèt gè fwad la fini.
Taywan sèvi ak Ayiti pou soutyen diplomatik lan ONU, pou kenbe l lan plas li okipe a.
Si se pa sa lap pèdi plas li e se Lachin sèlman ki pral reprezante tout chinwa y konpri Taywan.

Si Ayiti pa vote pou li ankò, pozisyon l ap febli e si sa kontinye lan 3 zou 3 zan lè lòt peyi yo swiv kouran an, lap pèdi plas li kanmenm.
Kidonk, se pa renmen taywanè renmen ayisyen.
Se jwèt diplomatik lagè fwad la ki ta p jwe.

Lan pwen lwayote ni lanmou lan bagay saa.

Lè Lagrenad wete sipo l pou l al jwen Lachin, Taywanè yo te mande anraje, yo repwoche Lagrenad e yo te menm mande pou Lagrenad remèt yo 23 milyon ke yo te envesti lan yon pwojè.


2-Ayiti pi enpotan lan rejyon an ke la Jamayik. Si relasyon peyi saa avèk Lachin rive lan faz envestisman, Ayiti kapab fè menm demach yo.

Lachin pa gen okenn pwoblèm pou anpyete sou sfè enfliyans meriken.
Yo fè l an Afrik, Lan Amerik di sid e sitou o Brezil.

Sa vle di ke si nou ta montre entère nou, yo ta p montre pa yo e lan pwen oken dout ke Ayiti gen rezèv ke Lachin ap chèche.

3- Malgre ke se yon dilem pou gouvènman ayisyen, yo kapab chèche mwayen pou defini e jwen entère Ayiti lan relasyon avèk Lachin ki pral dire.
Taywan ka b pa lan pozisyon pou ede Ayiti lan 5 an.
Deja yo rekonèt sa e yo mete dlo lan divin yo.
Yo gen bon relasyon avèk Lachin, se meriken ki ap soufle dife.

3- Diplomasy ayisyen merite developman ak pwogrè, men nou pakapab di ke yo pa fè pwogrè.

Ayiti lan bon relasyon avèk Etazini, Kiba, Venezyela, Iran, Lafrans.
Tout pol sayo opoze e pa gen anpil peyi lan zònn nan ki lan pozisyion saa.

Joel,

Gin yon denye mo mwen ta renmen ajoute seke Ayiti pap janm vote pou la chine toutotan Preval prezidan dapre mwen pou rezon sa-a:

Citation:

Maryse André Ontario, Canada 31/10/05 Taiwan qui est en train de financer avec beaucoup de dollars la campagne de Préval sera très satisfait de son choix. Le perdant sera le peuple haïtien, la Chine Communiste qui finançait le socialiste Serge Gilles, qui lui est en perte de vitesse.

kiles ki "nou nan manti"? Rico, al ajuste lunet ou yo.

Mwen we wap defan-n boss ou, min verite-a.

Traditionnellement, les Etats unis s'interessent peu a l' Afrique.. c'est le general james jones qui en 2006 priait le gouvernement american d'exercer une plus grande influence en Afrique. Il donnait trois raisons principales, le terrorisme islamiste, le controle de l'énergie et la presence chinoise... L'afrique est depuis longtemps le grenier de France, plus generalement de l'angleterre.

La zone caraibe ne represente pas un atout energetique..Les chinois ont certes des cooperations d'ordre culturel mais il ne me semble pas que la chine soit vraiment interessee pour le moment a cette zone...

Mais, il est evident que depuis 2006, les americains font tout pour renforcer leur presence... Dans ce cas, oui la chine ne va se priver de venir en Jamaique et pourquoi pas en Haiti.... mais c'est plus symbolique, qu'une veritable politique internationale.

Quant a Haiti avec une population de 9 millions... La chine ne va s'enquiquiner avec Haiti un pays desordres... il y a un probleme particulier en Haiti: c'est la presence importante des firmes americaines et le pacte diabolique de 1915 entre l'elite antinationale d'Haiti et les Etats unis. Je rappelle pour memoire que lors de l'invasion americaine, la bourgeoisie haitienne a pactise avec l'ennemi pendant que Peralte entrait en guerilla..

Quand a l'elite haitienne, elle fait historiquement office de CIA local, elle ne verra pas un bon oeil l'arrivee des chinois... qui pourrait desenclaver Haiti...

L'elite anti haitienne... venue de l'orient ayant fait pacte avec la CIA. est la principale cause du drame haitien .... car si la chine decide d'aider au developpement des infrastructures... La bourgeoisie perdra tout son monopole et ne pourra plus exploiter les pauvres paysans...

Je crains malheureusement qu'aucun chef d'Etat haitien ne prendra le risque de facher les americains en se rapprochant des chinois... D'ailleurs, je rappelle que si les haitiens ont leur ambassade a Taiwan c'est en grande partie en raisondes pressions venues de washington.

En Haiti... depuis 1914, les decisions sont prises a washington.... Mlaheuresement, Preval fait ce qu'il peut... Il n'a pas le choix.

Amerikin jus jodiya ap di ke li pap kite Taiwan tonbe nan min la Chine. Min mwen paka vale sa-a, paske Amerikin dwe la Chine twop lajan, e Ameriken for nan fe deal.

joel
je suis d'accord avec toi, mais je pense que ce n''est pas un hasard si la chine est presente dans tous les pays que tu as cites mais pas en Haiti... La raison est simplement que l'elite haitienne et les americains font obstacle a une telle presence... en faisant une pression diplomatique sur le gouvernement haitien.. j'ai discute avec le representant permanent haitien en chine.. je lui ai demande pourquoi Haiti continue a avoir des relatiions plus etroites avec taiwan qu'avec la chine... La reponse je crois qu'on la connait tous