Françafrique at 50
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DAKAR
– This month, Africa’s Francophone countries will mark the 50th
anniversary of their independence, and of the ties they maintain with
France. But is there much to celebrate?

Even before French
President Charles de Gaulle took office in 1958, he foresaw the wave of
revolutionary nationalism that would soon sweep across Africa, Asia,
Latin America, and the Middle East. As French president, he sought to
circumvent that tide by proposing to the leaders of France’s African
colonies a negotiated settlement for independence.

To accept de
Gaulle’s offer, these leaders had to agree, among other things, to allow
the stationing of French troops on their territory, provide France with
a steady supply of raw materials at pre-determined prices, assume all
colonial-era debts incurred by France, maintain the CFA Franc as their
common currency, and grant the French Treasury veto authority over their
sub-regional central banks. De Gaulle got most of what he wanted, and
granted independence.

Francophone Africa has been paying for
independence ever since. French troops have repeatedly intervened in
Chad, Gabon, Zaire, Central Africa, Togo, and Côte d’Ivoire to prop up
and protect complacent, corrupt, undemocratic, and incompetent leaders,
remove recalcitrant ones, or curb civil unrest. In Rwanda, France has
yet to live down its perceived role in enabling the 1994 genocide.

On
the monetary front, the CFA Franc Zone’s member countries dismantled
the federal structure that united them during French occupation and
erected trade barriers instead. The CFA franc issued by two sub-regional
central banks (BCEAO and BEAC) are not interchangeable. As a result,
regional trade and economic integration have been stifled.

The
ensuing economic difficulties were exacerbated under President François
Mitterrand, whose prime minister, Pierre Bérégovoy, pursued a strong
French franc – a policy that ultimately led to a massive 100%
devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994. And the euro’s appreciation
against the dollar from 2002 until very recently meant that the shift in
the CFA franc’s exchange-rate peg from the French franc to the euro
caused a repeat of that scenario. With the bulk of their exports
denominated in US dollars and their imports priced mainly in euros,
chronic structural deficits have wrecked the Franc Zone economies, and
the prospect of a second devaluation looms larger by the day.

More
appalling is the fact that France guarantees the CFA franc’s free
convertibility into hard currency, originally on the condition that all
15 Franc Zone countries surrender 100% of their foreign reserves to the
French Treasury. The amount was reduced to 65%, and then 50%, in 2005,
but France still deducts its share directly from these countries’ export
earnings.

Moreover, the mandatory 20% foreign exchange cover
stipulated in the convention signed with France in 1962 now stands at
110%. And a foreign-exchange control enacted in 1993 ensures that only
France benefits from this capital drain by limiting the free flow of
capital to France alone. The ensuing massive capital flight has bled the
region’s economies and eroded their competitiveness.

This is a
shame, because the economic situation elsewhere in Africa has been
improving in recent years – mostly in Eastern and Southern Africa, where
economic integration is proceeding within the Common Market for Eastern
and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Southern Africa Development
Community (SADC).

Unfortunately, West Africa’s regional grouping,
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), is not as
effective. With the establishment of ECOWAS, the Franc Zone countries
created two sub-regional groupings, WAEMU and CEMAC, in a bid to curb
British, American, and Nigerian influence. As a result, West African
countries are mostly missing out on Africa’s current revival – and the
prospect of a prolonged period of stagnation in the eurozone certainly
won’t help.

The imbalanced relationship between France and its
former African colonies would beggar belief if the psychology of
Africa’s “liberators” 50 years ago were overlooked. Senegal’s first
president, Léopold Sédar Senghor, was a strong believer in white
supremacy who once wrote that “reason is Helennic; emotion is Negro.”
Leon Mba, the first Gabonese president, was such a Francophile that he
bequeathed his personal fortune to France in order to finance the
construction of a hospital in Paris.

Similarly, the founder of
Côte d’Ivoire, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, coined the word “Françafrique” to
underline the total osmosis between France and its former colonies.
Houphouët-Boigny’s support for France’s African policy led him to
establish diplomatic ties with South Africa’s apartheid regime and make
his country a supply-transit route for the Biafra secessionists.

These
leaders were unlikely ever to dispute France’s diktat, and the same
applies to their heirs. Indicted French child abductors were freed by
Chad at France’s request. In Mali, several suspected terrorists –
members of a local branch of Al Qaeda – were set free in exchange for a
lone French hostage. Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade once labeled
the CFA franc a colonial relic – but that was when he was an opposition
leader. Now he considers it the best currency in the world.

This
economic and psychological status quo ensures that, after 50 years of
independence, true emancipation for Françafrique will remain a distant
prospect. If there is something to celebrate, it is that the balance of
global economic power is shifting to emerging countries, and that new
role models and a new generation raised in a globalized world are
becoming ready to assume the mantle of leadership.

Copyright:
Project Syndicate, 2010.
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